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Introduction 
Even though there is no agreement among researchers about what constitutes 
underground economic activities,1 their existence is not generally disputed. Therefore, we 
need to know their magnitude for many reasons. The knowledge is, first and foremost, of 
considerable interest to policy makers who must decide on public subsidies and 
assistances that they are providing to low income and indigent people.  The existence of 
such activities also points to a more fundamental issue. Policy makers may not need to do 
as much if these activities are pervasive and significant.  The aggregate data such as 
income,2
Over the past twenty-five years many studies have suggested the existence of an 
underground economy in Iran that is, at least, as large if not larger than the formal 
economy. However, hard evidence has not been provided to support this suspicion. In this 
study an estimate of Iran’s underground economy will be attempted.  Section I of this 
paper provides reasons for the existence of underground or unofficial economies.  Section 
II discusses difficulties associated with definition and estimation.  Section III will provide 
the estimation methods.  Section IV is used for data analysis.  Section V is used for a 
brief discussion of theoretical formulation of demand for money and modifications made 
for the particular Iranian case.  In section VI empirical results are presented.  Section VII 
will be used for summary and implications. 
 unemployment, inflation, and the magnitude of the tax base might be 
significantly distorted.   
 
I—Why Do Underground Activities Exist? 
In general, on an individual level, the most important reason for engaging in the 
underground economy is to earn a living or to enhance ones disposable income.  On 
institutional levels, participation in the underground economies stems from the extent of 
government regulations and perception of government’s legitimacy. If regulations 
become too overbearing, people would try to avoid them by joining the underground 
economy and hide their infractions.  Also, if people perceive the government as corrupt 
and unrepresentative, they would do whatever possible to avoid taxes. Therefore, black 
market activities exist in all countries at any time in various degrees mainly to evade 
taxes or to maintain public support such as unemployment insurance benefits, food 
stamps, and other welfare payments at any time.  However, the practice seems to be less 
severe in countries where tax payment is more acceptable (tax moral3
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those countries where tax evasion for political and/or religious reasons is the norm. In 
advanced countries well established people more readily comply with their tax 
obligations than do newcomers. New immigrants, in general, tend to engage in 
underground activities to avoid taxes, a habit learned in their old countries. Also because 
of the tendency of new immigrants to interact with each other within the “community” 
more than they do with “outsiders,” they tend to be more discrete.  
A third factor that is very relevant for the existence of an underground economy 
in the US and in Iran is the large number of “illegal aliens” in the country.  Iran has been 
a recipient of a large number of immigrants (refugees) in the last two decades from Iraq 
and Afghanistan for obvious reasons.  Almost all of them engage in some sort of illegal 
activities, in either what is considered legal or illegal activities in nature, to earn a living. 
The United Nations reported that there existed over three millions of refugees in Iran.  
Finally, revolution created uncertainty and in the uncertain post-revolutionary era when 
lawlessness and confiscations were common, being liquid has added to the need to be 
“unobservable.”   
 
II— What Constitutes Underground Activities and How Can They Be Detected?  
Activities that lend themselves more to this practice could be legal or illegal. 
Activities that are legal in nature could be divided into tax avoidance, which is legal (e.g., 
employee discounts and fringe benefits) and tax evasion, which are illegal such as 
unreported self-employment income.  Activities that are illegal in nature could be either 
monetary or non monetary such as trade in stolen goods, drugs, prostitution, and 
gambling.  What constitutes underground activities, therefore, depends on one’s 
perception.  Tanzi (1980, 1983) and Tucker defined underground economic activities as 
all legal activities that go unmeasured. Feige (1979, 1985) defined underground 
economic activities as all those which go unmeasured, legal or illegal.  
 
III— Estimation Methods 
In order to estimate the magnitudes of underground economies, one could either 
resort to surveys of the public or use already collected and published data sources. Each 
has its own difficulties and shortcomings.  In conducting surveys one should contend 
with their associated costs and more importantly, the veracity of the responses.  After all, 
we would be relying on the “cheaters” to tell us how and how much they “cheat.”4
The officially observed and measured economic activities of any country are 
presented in National Income Statistics. Since we estimate Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), in two different ways, it would potentially be a way of detecting the magnitude of 
the underground economy. That is, if we compare the GDP estimated by expenditures 
method
 The 
difficulty of using the officially collected data on economic activities is the “tentative 
nature” of the relationship between the observed data and unobserved data about 
underground economy.   
5 to that of income method6 and if there is a discrepancy, the discrepancy point to 
the existence of underground activities.  That is, if people are spending more than their 
income, one could argue that the discrepancy is due to additional income that they earn 
from the underground activities. However, it is possible that the two sides do agree 
despite the existence of a significant underground economy. If people receive income 
under the table and spend it in markets that are also beyond the reaches of the official 
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system, there would be no discrepancy while both incomes and expenditures remain 
unobserved and unreported. 
Another alternative would be to look at variables that should be similar in 
different countries and if they are dissimilar, the dissimilarity might be due to the 
existence of the underground economies. For example, one could consider labor 
participation in similar countries and assume it must be equal.  If one is significantly 
smaller, one could infer that a significant number of people are earning a living through 
underground activities.   
Finally, the monetary approach, the method that is used for this study, depends on 
the assumption that using money is the most viable and safest method of concealing 
transactions on either side of the ledger, on the income side or on the expenditures side.  
This is based on the assumption that the demand for money is stable, which has been 
found to be the case for Iran (Amir Kia, Ali F. Darratt, 2007).  In this approach, one 
should look for any anomalous jump in the money ratios relative to their “historical 
levels.”  If there are jumps that could not be explained by changes in other economic 
variables, these could allude to an increase in underground activities.7
 
 
IV—The data8
Can we see underground activities in the quantity of money in circulation?  Figure 
1 shows the real and nominal currency per capita for Iran between 1959 and 2004. Per 
capita currency holding increased from 92.72 in 1338 (1959) to a high of 2196.8 in 1358 
(1979, the first post revolution year) and after a period of ups and downs, it climbed to 
2587.82 in1383 (2004).  Presuming that technological advances in banking should have 
lowered the need for real balances, these increases might reflect underground activities.  
 
Figure 1
nominal and real per capita currency
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V—The Demand for Real Balances 
The following model or a variation of it has universally been accepted: 
 
(1) mit = mit (yt , R t)  δ mit/δy  >0,  δ mit/δR <0 
 
Where: 
mit   = real balances (cu, m1 or m2) 
yt    = real income. 
Rt   = a nominal interest rate. 
 
 
 The disturbance term is assumed to be a white noise, E(εt)=0, and constant variance, 
σ2.  In this closed economy model,9 it is assumed that all adjustments between the desired 
and actual real balances take place in one period.  If there is an assumption of partial 
adjustment, a stock adjustment process is assumed and the lagged dependent variable, mt-
1, is added to the equation.
10
  
  So the estimated equation would become:  
(2) mit =  mit (yt , R t , mt-1 ) δ m
i
t/δy  >0,  δ mit/δR <0 , δ mit/δ mit-1 >0 
 
  On a priori basis one would expect that an increase in income would lead to 
increases in both assets and transaction demand for money.  Since we are interested in 
estimating the demand for currency for transaction purposes, we use disposable income 
rather than gross income.  Therefore, the income coefficient is expected to be positive.  
Also, if all adjustments do not take place in one period, one would expect the coefficient 
of the lagged real balances to be positive also.  However, holding money has an 
associated opportunity cost.  Economic agents tend to minimize this cost.  Therefore, 
when there is high (low) cost, they hold smaller (larger) real balances.  As a result, the 
coefficient of the interest rate is expected to be negative. 
 
The Iranian Case 
In this study our equations are modified to reflect the Iranian experience.  That is, 
rather than including a nominal or real rate of interest, log of consumer price index is 
included as a proxy for the opportunity cost of holding money.  This will solve the 
problem of inadequate to nonexistent data on the nominal and/or real rates of interest as 
well as their artificiality in the Iranian economy.  Therefore, log of CPI would be a much 
more reliable and acceptable proxy for the cost of holding money in Iran because of the 
common custom of conducting transactions, for the most part, in cash.  It is also 
justifiable to do so because of a lack of a sophisticated financial market in Iran to provide 
a historically consistent measure of opportunity cost of holding money that could be used 
in the estimation of the demand for the real balances.  
After the revolution of 1979, people did not adjust their consumption levels 
despite a prolonged and precipitous decline in real officially observed and measured 
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income.  This must have happened either through underground activities or by selling 
their real assets.  Therefore, rather than including real income, we include the ratio of real 
consumption to real income as a scale variable.   
Finally, we incorporated two dummy variables for the tax law change in 1348 (1969) 
and for the 1979 revolution.   Therefore the modified equation that is used for this study 
is:  
(3) cut = cu (ct/yt, πt, τt, dtl, dr)     δcu/δy  >0,  δcu/δπ <0 , δcu/δτ>0, δcu/δdtl>0, δcu/δr>0 
 
Where: 
cut = log of real per capita currency  
ct/yt  = ratio of log of real consumption to log of real income 
πt  = log of CPIt  
τt= log of direct per capita taxes 
dtl, dr = Dummy variables for tax law change, and revolution 
 
VI—Empirical Results 
 
a—The data 
As is the case for all of the macroeconomic variables, our time series are subject 
to stationarity problem. Table 1 below shows the D-F test statistics for the variables used 
in this study. 
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (H0: there is a unit root) 
 
 
Variable 
Levels First difference 
Intercept/ 
no trend 
Intercept 
and trend 
Intercept/ 
no trend 
Intercept 
and trend 
CUt = per capita currency -1.15 -1.76 -4.07 -4.02 
ct/yt -2.11 -2.21 -6.93 -6.93 
πt  = lncpi -2.53 -3.56 -7.27 -7.25 
τ= direct taxes 0.54 -1.96 -6.99 -7.05 
All of the first differences are at least significant at 5% level. 
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b—Regression results  
 
 
Table 2: OLS Results. cut = cu (ct/yt, πt, τt, dtl, dr) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
ct/yt 5.743090 0.105303 54.53877 0.0000 
πt -1.090126 0.132711 -8.214270 0.0000 
τt 1.004718 0.113678 8.838300 0.0000 
dtl 0.523885 0.195275 2.682807 0.0106 
dr 0.611959 0.146349 4.181499 0.0002 
R-squared 0.934191     Mean dependent var 6.896000 
Adjusted R-squared 0.927610     S.D. dependent var 0.933647 
S.E. of regression 0.251201     Akaike info criterion 0.179310 
Sum squared resid 2.524070     Schwarz criterion 0.380050 
Log likelihood 0.965536     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.254143 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.962218  
 
 
Using Eviews 6, an OLS regression was estimated.  All of the variables have the 
expected signs and all are statistically significant.  The opportunity costs coefficient is 
negative and significant.  This implies that people try to reduce their real balances in the 
face of higher opportunity cost.  Ratio of consumption to income has positive coefficients 
and is significant.  Higher taxes lead to higher cash economy.  Finally, revolution resulted 
in a larger cash economy as well.   
 High R-squared and low D-W statistic, however, might indicate a potentially spurious 
equation.   To deal with this suspicion, a Johansen cointegration test was conducted. In 
order for an OLS model to be valid rather than spurious, at least one integrating equation 
must be present.  The results in Table 3 show that under any specification, i. e., 
with/without intercept or trend, at least one cointegrating equation exists at 5% level.   
 
 
Table 3: Johansen test summary 
 
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
Test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 1 2 3 2 2 
Max-Eig 2 1 1 2 2 
Critical values based on MacKinnon - Haug - Michelis (1999). 
 
Table 4 shows a normalized unrestricted cointegrating equation. This means that a single 
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equation for the long run demand for per capita real currency is appropriate and a valid 
process.   
 
Table 4: normalized unrestricted cointegrating equation 
CUt ct/yt πt τt 
1.00 1004.31 -42.47 30.55 
 (229.58) (8.63) (7.37) 
 
A final step is to estimate an error correction model.  Below is the error correction model 
for the data.  
 
∆CUt  =  - 0.005 CUt -1+ 1004.31 ct-1/yt-1  - 42.47 πt-1 +  30.54 τt-1 - 1006.57 
     [-3.58]    [ 4.37]                  [-4.92]          [ 4.14234]         
 
- .099 ∆CUt-1 - 0.064 ∆CUt-2   -  0.41 ∆CUt-3 + 1.00 ∆ct-1/yt-1  - 1.01  ∆ct-2/yt-2  
 [-0.528] [-0.34]      [-2.24]              [-2.24]              [-0.71] 
 
- 2.34 ∆ct-3/yt-3 - 0.73 ∆πt-1 + 0.55 ∆πt-2 - 0.64 ∆πt-3 + 0.064 ∆ τt -1  - 0.11 ∆ τt -2  
 [-1.718]  [-3.034]       [ 2.033]      [-2.63]          [1.149]      [-2.00] 
 
- 0.20 ∆ τt -3  + 0.24  +  0.150 dtl - 0.206 dr 
 [-3.49]           [3.85]      [3.32]  [-3.58] 
 
Summary Statistics for the Error Correction Model 
 R-squared  0.811791  Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.30E-11  
 Adj. R-squared  0.698865  Determinant resid covariance  1.79E-12 
 Sum sq. resids  0.092485  Log likelihood  321.7535 
 S.E. equation  0.060823  Akaike information criterion -12.37822 
 F-statistic  7.188724  Schwarz criterion -9.536197 
 Log likelihood  66.75625 
 
 Akaike AIC -2.475915 
 Schwarz SC -1.807204 
 Mean dependent  0.064146 
 S.D. dependent  0.110837 
     
     Numbers in brackets under the error correction model representation are student t 
statistics.   
 
 
 The first term, the cointegrating term, is negative and significant, which means the 
regression converges toward its long term path after a disturbance. Variables ct/yt, πt, and 
τt as well as dummy variables dtl and dr have correct signs and are significant.   
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Estimate of Iran’s Underground Economy 
  Using our error correction model, we are now set to estimate Iran’s underground 
economy.  In order to do so, we calculate currency holdings under two regimes, a regime 
assuming the existence of taxes and tax law change and a regime without the existence of 
taxes and tax law changes.  In order to change the calculations from logs to levels, we 
add to each equation ln(CUt-1)+ ∆ln(cpi) + ∆ln(population).  The two equations, therefore 
are: 
 
A—Regime With Taxes. 
  In this case currency holding would be: 
CUtax  =  exp(- 0.005 CUt -1+ 1004.31 ct-1/yt-1  - 42.47 πt-1 +  30.54 τt-1 - 1006.57- .099 
∆CUt-1 - 0.064 ∆CU t-2   -  0.41 ∆CU t-3 + 1.00 ∆ct-1/yt-1  - 1.01  ∆ ct-2/yt-2 - 2.34 ∆ct-3/yt-3 - 
0.73 ∆πt-1 + 0.55 ∆πt-2 - 0.64 ∆πt-3 + 0.064 ∆ τt -1  - 0.11 ∆ τt -2 - 0.20 ∆ τt -3 + 0.24 +0.150 
dtl - 0.206 dr + ln(CUt-1)+ ∆ln(cpi) + ∆ln(population)) 
 
B—Regime Without Taxes: 
 
  In this case currency holdings would be: 
 
CUnotax  =  exp(- 0.005 CUt -1+ 1004.31 ct-1/yt-1  - 42.47 πt-1 +  30.54 τt-1 - 1006.57- .099 
∆CUt-1 - 0.064 ∆CU t-2   -  0.41 ∆CU t-3 + 1.00 ∆ct-1/yt-1  - 1.01  ∆ ct-2/yt-2 - 2.34 ∆ct-3/yt-3 - 
0.73 ∆πt-1  
+ 0.55 ∆πt-2 - 0.64 ∆πt-3 + 0.24 - 0.206 dr + ln(CUt-1)+ ∆ln(cpi) + ∆ln(population)) 
 
Within the second regime, i.e., a regime in the absence of taxes, the public would hold 
much less than otherwise.    In order to obtain an estimate of “illegal currency” holdings 
of the public we subtract CUnotax  from CUtax [CUnotax - CUtax].   
 
C—Income Estimate 
  Assuming that income velocities of money in official and unofficial economies 
are similar,11
 
 we could multiply the amount of “illegal currency in the hands of public” 
by the official income velocity of money to estimate the income levels of the 
underground economy.  The following graph shows these magnitudes. 
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Figure 2: underground economy as a percentage of the GDP
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Surprisingly, despite the current understanding, the underground economy today, at least 
relative to the pre-revolutionary era, is almost non-existent.  It appears that the unofficial 
economy was much more pronounced and significantly larger than during the post 
revolution.  One possible explanation is that the official data already accounts for such 
activities now compared to the pre-revolutionary years.  It is also possible that those who 
engage in these activities today are more in tune with the regime and therefore support it 
in every way possible, including paying taxes.  Finally, it is possible that people were 
more liquid because of the extraordinary hustle and bustle of the early 70s when, all of 
sudden, an enormous amount of money was put into circulation due to higher oil prices 
and revenues. 
 
VII—Summary and Conclusion 
The perception that Iranian economy has stagnated after the revolution and there 
is rampant unemployment/underemployment might be illusory if there is a large 
underground economy.  This study shows that so-called underground economy; besides 
and beyond what is reported by the Central Bank data that support millions of youths 
cannot be substantiated.    
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Figure 3: Real GDP Per Capital With and Without the Underground Economy
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 Figure 3 shows the real GDP per capita of Iran with and without the adjustments 
for the underground economy.  It implies that the economy before the revolution was 
much larger than it has been previously thought.  A striking implication of this study is 
the fact that the per capita income has not reached anywhere close to its pre-revolutionary 
era.  This study shows that per capita income in 2004 (5897 rials) was less than half of its 
peak in 1974 (12323 rials).  
 Again, it is important to note that in rationalizing the low GDP, there are those 
who believe that the officially reported GDP is only a part of the total actual real GDP. 
That is, some believe that a large part of Iranian economy is not reported.  Therefore, 
there is a great deal of underground (unreported) economic activities in Iran that are not 
included in the reported data.  Even though one cannot deny the existence of this 
unofficial underground economy, it cannot be shown that they are not included in the 
official data reported by the Central Bank of Iran.  Therefore, we can safely assume that, 
by all approximations, the official data to be a good representative of actual real Iranian 
economy and the proposition of much larger economy due to the existence of a large 
underground economy beyond and in addition to the officially published data is, more or 
less, an exaggeration. This lack of unreported economy implies that economic cost of the 
revolution and consequent internal and external policies have had a more serious and 
lasting impact than previously thought because what is reported is all there is and no 
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more.  Therefore, the argument that the economy is much larger in reality than what is 
reported and therefore people are not as worse-off as the data show does not hold water.   
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Endnotes 
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1. Many terms are used to refer to underground economic activities.  These include, 
among others, black, gray, cash, informal, invisible, irregular, and under the table.  In 
this study we simply use underground activities. 
2. The potential distortions are through moonlighting, nondisclosures of cash income, 
nondisclosures of employment by welfare recipients and unemployed, failure to 
disclose interest income, and barter.  See Christopher Bajada, December 1999. 
3. Tax moral is an index, which is supposed to measure people’s attitudes toward the 
government.  For more details see Bruno Frey and Hannelore Weck.  
4.  According to Frey, 1983, the Italian Statistical Office successfully used this method. 
5. Total expenditures are equal to household (private consumption) expenditures, private 
business investment, government expenditures, and net exports. 
6. Total incomes received by factors of production as wages and salaries, net interest 
income, rent, profits, and adjusting for depreciation and indirect business taxes should 
be equal to the GDP. 
7. One needs to be attentive to the potential pitfalls of the monetary approach method.  It 
generally assumes unchanged benchmark ratios (historical levels); and the 
underground economy uses solely currency as medium of exchange; each dollar 
supports a given level of income in both the regular and underground economies, i.e., 
a dollar equally supports a dollar of manufactured product as well as a dollar of 
services in the market, legal and illegal. 
8. The choice of data period is dictated by availability.  Consistent data on national 
income and accounts goes only back to 1953. There are data on currency prior to 
1959 but not for other national income variables.  All of the data used in this study are 
extracted from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics electronic database except 
for the GDP deflator, which was partially derived from Bank Markazi Iran’s web site. 
9. See Gregory Falls and Hamid Zangenehzadeh for a discussion of an open economy 
approach to the demand for money. 
10. See Bajada, 1999 Goldfed, 1973, 1976, Chow, 1966) 
11. There is not much one could do to improve upon this seemingly bold assumption.   
